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INTRODUCTION 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAPs) have generated hot debate since 
they commenced. In most cases they started in mid-1980s. There has been a tendency 
by some observers to associate ESAPs with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Sometimes it is associated with both the IMF and the World Bank. This is because of 
the role which these two bodies play in the programme design. The IMF usually assists 
restructuring developing countries with macro-economic stabilisation policies package. 
The World Bank nom1ally assist in devising actual structural reform poticy measures. 
The IMF has supported implementation of agreed policies with funds from Structural 
Adjustment Facility (SAF) and later from the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
(ESAF). The World Bank lend support with loans to enable implementation of structural 
policy measures. Yet there can be independently designed and implemented ESAPs/. 
Nigeria and Zambia did try their own ESAPs albeit for a very short period and without 
much success. Most ESAPs in Sub-Sahara Africa involve a partnership among the host 
government, the IMF, the World Bank and other cooperating partners. 
On the one side of the debate are those who think that ESAPs were the only remedy that 
could be devised and given in the face of deteriorating economic situation in Africa and 
elsewhere. They advocate continued pursuit of these programmes. There is a growing 
number of those who agree with this view but advocate some adjustments in design and 
approach to the standard package, due to lessons of experience gathered during 
implementation of these programmes over the years. 
On the other extreme are those who advocate scrapping of ESAPs altogether and trying 
a different approach. Suggested alternative route has, somehow, never been articulated 
convincingly. 
It should be noted from the start that all countries in the world, including developed 
industrial countries, have and still are adjusting their economies although words used 
and approach adopted many differ. It is because of successful adaptation that their 
economies have continued to grow. Economies must be enabled to cope with ever 
changing situations in the world. Some countries have been able to pre-empt problems 
or to at least react appropriately very early, thus obviating or at least minimising the 
cost of adjustment. In this paper, however, focus will be on SAF and ESAF supported 
ESAPs. 
In this paper focus will be on Sub-Saharan Africa. North Africa has broken ranks 
economically and joined the lot of rapidly growing developing economies. 
2. HOW DID AFRICAN ECONOMIES END UP WITH ESAPs? 
After Independence there was a slow econmic growth. In the 1970s and 1980s, at 
different times and rates, most economies deteriorated. Heavy borrowing ensued. Some 
countries fell into a debt trap while others remained heavily indebted. What were the 
causes of this predicament? 
Observers differ in attributing root causes of the apparent drastic economic 
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deterioration. Some recognise only external factors and to some degree natural 
phenomena. Others accept only internal causes. 
ExternaJ factors, to which other developing countries that continued to experience high 
rate of growth were also subjected and had to face them (that is, these external causes 
were not selective), were; among others: 
a. deteriorating terms of trade against primary commodity producing countries. 
Primary goods prices fell while those of manufactures and imported services rose. 
Most Sub-Saharan African countries rely heavily on the export of at most very 
few of primary commodities; 
b. the oil price shocks were another adverse factor; 
c. some cite difficult access to the markets of developed industrial countries; 
d. others attributed high failure rate of externally funded developed projects to 
unrestrained intervention and constraining conditionalities which deprived 
projects of domestic ownership and drive, the two essential elements for project's 
sustained success; 
e. Cold War led to the external support of incompetent and corrupt regimes which 
mismanaged the economies. 
Again some argue that other developing countries in Asia, Caribbean, Latin America, 
Pacific and Middle East, faced these same circumstances. Some of them were able to 
cope with the situation. Therefore they contend, these cannot be considered to be the 
whole story. 
Natural phenomena covers such disasters as prolonged and severe drought in the early 
1980s. As agriculture contributed most to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), this had 
a devastating effect on growth. Malawi, Mozambique, Sudan and Swaziland sustained 
hurricane destruction and floods. 
Internal factors are attributed to the behaviour of authorities in African countries. 
a. Macro-economic management left ample room for improvement to say the least. 
In-advisable fiscal, monetary, exchange rate and incomes policies were pursued. 
Wage rates were unrelated to productivity. Macro-economic environment was 
unstable. 
b. Medium to long-term development strategies and tactics adopted either bore little 
or no fruit. In some instances they made matters worse. Priorities were not well 
chosen. As a result human resources development was retarded; agriculture was 
strangulated by controls and regulations; infrastructure, physical and 
institutional remained poor and unmaintained. Unsuccessful industrialization and 
trade policies were followed. Civil service grew rapidly in size but equally rapidly 
grew in inefficiency and ineffectiveness. Increasing role of government in 
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economic activity merely led to slower economic growth or to decline. 
c. elements of corruption and nepotism set in. Corruption led to misuse of 
resources; nepotism to under-utilisation of human resources available and 
demoralization. 
d. Repression resulted in violation of human rights and denial of civil liberties. 
Initiatives was dampened and brain drain and demoralization were the result. 
Ensuing poverty and worsened inequitability in the distribution of income and wealth 
resulted in the socio-political strain that led to political instability. lll-prepared 
dictatorships emerged. Matters only got worse as more policy mistakes were made. 
Economic effects of these developments were adverse. Macroeconomic environment 
became unstable. This was caused by growing fiScal deficits which reached 
unmanageable levels, unrestrained money supply, over-valued currencies, and 
mismanaged price and wage controls (or incomes policy). The result were high rates of 
inflation, balance of payments problems, crowding out of the private sector in the 
domestic money markets, growing internal and external debt, distorted relative prices 
in the market and numerous regulations and controls mainly attempting to deal with 
symptoms rather than the core problem. 
On the supply side real growth either sloweo down further, stagnated or declined. 
Investment, both public and private, internal and external, slowed down. Consequently 
production fell (declined value added per year). Poverty increased. A vicious spiral had 
commenced. Investment in human resources in the form of delivery of social services 
(health, education and training) suffered a set-back. Institutional capacity building could 
not be continued. Government bureaucracy became overweight, incapacitated and 
undisciplined. Physical infrastructure could not be maintained. The fonnal sector 
shrunk while the informal sector grew as people seek alternative means of livelihood. 
Quite clearly both external causes, which in Africa were not addressed the same way as 
in East and Southeast Asia, and internal causes, should be recognised. The impact of 
either should not be exaggerated. 
As a way out of this quagmire of heavy indebtedness, balance of payments problems, 
raging inflation, declining real per capita growth and spreading f?OVerty, resort to 
ESAPs was made. 
3. E.S.A.P. SUPPORTED BY S.A.F. AND E.S.A.F.: 
Due to lack of financial resources and in many cases due to lack of capacity to design 
economic restructuring programmes, Brettonwoods institutions were involved. 
At first financial support for macro-economic stabilisation came from the high interest 
rate, shorter-term repayment window meant for middle income developing countries. 
Soon a special soft window was devised, it was called Structural Adjustment Facility 
4 
'• 
(SAF). It was to be followed by Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) which 
has now expired. Since April 1994, successor to ESAF has commenced operations. 
About 78 countries are designated as eligible to ESAF successor. 
Prescriptions under SAF and ESAF supported ESAP are quite standard. There are two 
aspects. There is the macroeconomic stabilisation aspect. There is also the structural 
adjustment and reform component. In the former it is the Il\1F that features. The 
World Bank assists with the latter. 
l\1acroeconomic stabilisation policy measures usually include: 
Reduction of fiscal deficit to manageable levels or preferably its total 
elimination; 
Properly managed money supply as well as demand for money by way of 
guided domestic credit and interest rates; 
currency exchange rate regime aiming at realistic levels (that is, reflecting 
the true market value of the currency); 
foreign exchange control deregulation; 
liberalisation of interventionist incomes policy. 
Expected results from these policies are subdued inflation, improved external · current 
account balance, increased share of the private sector in domestic credit, and 
improvement in the management of public debt, both internal and external. 
Actual structural adjustment and reforms on the supply side of the economy usually 
involve: 
public finance reform; 
financial sector reform; 
mobilization of financial resources for investment (that is, savings) 
deregulation of the factor market; 
privatisation of state enterprises and commercialization of strategic 
natural monopolies; 
institution of incentives to attract both domestic and foreign private 
investment; 
other country specific measures aimed at facilitating increased production; 
liberalization of trade (in the product market); 
The expected outcome from both macroeconomic stabilization policy measures and 
structural adjustment and reform measures is to set a stage for a strong and sustained 
real economic growth with improved equity. These policies merely lay ground for 
growth. Other prudent economic development policies still have to be designed adopted 
and pursued in order to actually realize real growth. The private sector usually thrives 
in this type of environment. It could take the lead in growth if allowed to operate freely. 
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4. SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: PERFORMANCE UNDER E.S.A.P.s. 
Performance of Sub-Saharan African countries varied widely. On the overall 
performance was not good. There are a number of reasons underlying poor track 
record: 
a. A number of countries delayed considerably in acknowledging existence of a 
monumental economic problem. Extensive economic damage was allowed to occur 
before any reaction. Consequently rather drastic and often painful measures have 
had to be taken to rectify the situation. 
b. In many countries there was a failure to involve interest and pressure social 
groups in the progranm1e formulation stage. Education of the general public 
about the progranm1e (informing the public about the nature and extent of 
adopted policy measures, reasons underlying chosen line of action, and results 
that may be expected) was not undertaken in many cases. Perhaps incumbent 
governments feared what they considered to be self-criticism. With involvement 
and adequate public education, progranm1e ownership would have been elicited 
and there would have been more patience and tolerance in the face of short-term 
hardships brought about by E.S.A.P.s. This opportunity was missed. 
c. Lack of genuine conm1itment to the progranunes both at political and executive 
levels was another setback. This led to: 
• delayed application of policy measures. Procrastination resulted in a worsening 
situation. Parameters on which policy measure was based changed in the 
meantime. Effect of the policy was dampened. 
• partial implementation of policy measures. The economy was denied appropriate 
full dose of the remedy. These half-measures bore little or no fruit; 
• erratic and intermittent policy implementation reversals (that is, go-stop-go 
approach) created credibility problems for the progranunes. 
• selective execution of policy measures, choosing only those considered to be less 
contentious, instead of applying the entire package; was yet another setback. 
Complementarity, synergies and consistencies, in built in the package were thus 
destroyed. An example are runaway fiscal deficits paired with very tight 
monetary policy. 
• missing proper sequencing of policy measures created more problems than it 
solved. 
• reluctance or failure to follow-up and monitor implementation of policies often 
resulted in inaction. 
d. Some argue that problems arose at design stage of the programme. Some policy 
measures were stated in generalities leaving details to the restructuring 
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authorities. Sometimes details worked out were not in favour of the spirit of the 
programme. An example is cut in government expenditure. Left to governments 
to choose areas to be cut, some reduced spending on essential social areas such 
as education, health and delivery of services to the poor. Overweight and 
ineffective bureaucracies and other unproductive activities were retained. 
e. Due to still undeveloped institutional infrastructure in many instances, especially 
as it applies to still to be attained financial sector reform and development 
coupled with yet to be realized financial deepening, transmission mechanism of 
polices does not work well. Consequently policy measures, particularly monetary 
policy, failed to trigger expected reactions to the extent desired. 
Saving, investment, smooth privatization process, and trade were all frustrated 
to some degree due to inadequately developed financial and capital markets. 
f. The still low institutional capacity and the still inadequately developed human 
resources impeded progress on all fronts of the programme. Capacity to execute 
policies has been low. 
g. Socio-political stability, which is so essential (that is, a necessary but not 
sufficient condition) for increased private domestic and foreign investment, still 
elude many African countries. Consequently investor confidence remains low. 
h. Lip service aside, women are still not fully accorded their rightful place in the 
development effort. By so doing adjusting countries are denying themselves use 
of all human resources at their disposal. 
i. Good governance, respect for human rights and permission of civil liberties, have 
not yet permeated to all Sub-Sahara African countries. In fact there has been 
relapses in some countries. Yet these attributes do set a stage for creativity, 
initiative and entrepreneurship as well as high morale, all of which are direly 
needed for brisk economic activity required for economic growth. 
What emerges is that it is erroneous to blame Sub-Sahara Africa's economic hardships 
on ESAPs. For full effect ESAP have to be followed closely. Matters would have been 
worse without ESAP. 
On the side of the IMF and the World Bank, a number of points are noteworthy: 
a. time allocated for effecting very fundamental structural reforms is often not long 
enough given the deep rooted traditions and inherent sensitivities and rigidities 
in developing countries. Heavy pressure is usually brought to bear on authorities 
to produce quick results on matters that can only take time to accomplish 
successfully; 
b. on the whole financial resources being allocated to support ESAPs are not 
adequate. As a result, undue strain remains during the adjustment process; 
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c. there has been instances where Brettonwoods institutions displayed inadequate 
sensitivity to fragile situations such as policy measures that can trigger socio-
political unrest; 
d. In the earlier days of ESAPs the IMF had a tendency of being somewhat overly 
doctrinaire in its approach. Pure principles of economics were followed strictly 
without taking into account the fact that some of the tacit assumptions underlying 
those principles do not necessarily hold true in the still underdeveloped economies 
of Sub-Sahara Africa. One example is the expected response to positive real 
interest rates on deposits. Lack of alternatives and long distances to bank 
branches and poor transportation and communication services could frustrate 
expected response. 
e. Focus of the recommended programme is usually on the formal sector. Yet the 
informal sector grew during economic hardships and it remains large, continuing 
to provide livelihood for a large number, usually majority, of households. 
f. Focus on the poor, protection of vulnerable social groups, and provision of safety 
nets were brought into ESAPs as an afterthought, mainly as a reaction to world 
public opinion. Initially the tendency became that of treating such needs more as 
an appendage rather than an integral part of the programme. 
g. In developing ESAPs policy mix, quesf for closer regional economic integration 
was not accommodated. Some of the adopted policies conflicted with the spirit 
of regional economic integration. 
The Brettonwoods institutions, however, have shown that they have been listening 
carefully and learning through experiences. One has observed definite willingness to 
accommodate all these considerations increasingly over the last six years. This is 
encouraging. 
With regard to other cooperating partners, adjustment process has been frustrated by: 
a. mild but welcome debt relief. Heavily indebted countries have had their burden 
only marginally lightened.External debt of a number of countries is still at 
unsustainable levels. They are still unable to spare some resources for growth and 
development. Debt servicing absorbs large portions of value added. Capital 
inflows are not enough to offset this outflow. 
b. Access to the markets of the OECD countries has not been easy for a number of 
Sub-Saharan African countries. Trade liberalization under ESAP has not been 
reciprocated abroad. 
As a result of all these obstacles, Sub-Saharan Africa performance on ESAPs has been 
a mixed bag. Some countries performed fairly well; others poorly, to varying degrees. 
By and large there was little progress on macro-economic stabilization policies (fiscal, 
monetary, exchange rate and incomes policies). There was hardly any progress, in many 
cases, on the structural reforms front. There was sluggishness in reforming public 
8 
'• 
enterprises. (privatisation, commercialization or trimming down of parastatals), 
financial sector reform and in public service reform. There is still need to complete 
liberalization process in agriculture and trade. 
5. SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: 
It is fashionable to examine possibility of drawing some lessons for Sub-Saharan Africa 
from those rapidly growing economies of Southeast Asia , namely, Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Thailand. 
Singapore, Taiwan, Hong-Kong and South Korea do not provide as suitable comparisons 
as the former group because they started growing rapidly three decades ago and were 
faced with a different international economic and political climate. 
The idea is to compare Southeast Asian three at the time before take-off with Sub-
Sahara of today in order to see if some of the policies that brought about success could 
be replicated. 
a. Agriculture: Southeast Asia three, although they have relatively less arable land 
than the average in Sub-Sahara Africa, the soils are more fert.ile, and the rainfall 
is more reliable. 
b. Population: Population size on the average has been higher in Southeast Asia 
than in Sub-Saharan Africa. This made domestic markets viable. 
c. Laboitr: Labour productivity and discipline tended to be higher in Southeast Asia 
three than in Sub-Sahara Africa. 
Beyond these, differences become hard to come by. It is similarities that become glaring. 
Quality of human resources at the time of independence was about the same. Physical 
infrastructure and institutional capacity were comparable. Mineral and fossil fuels 
deposits endowments are not that different. 
Both regions faced the same international economic and political environment. Yet one 
managed to achieve strong and sustained growth while the other experienced economic 
decline. 
Differences seem to be mainly in the manner in which external factors were addressed. 
The design of developmental policy packages and strategies adopted and implemented 
differed. Those of Southeast Asia worked. Those of much of Africa did not bring 
success. In Southeast Asia ESAPs were undert.aken early before considerable economic 
damage was done and were resolutely executed and closely adhered to, thus bringing 
about expected results. In much of Africa, as already observed, there was delayed 
action. When action did come it was only half-hearted. (Peter B. Robinson and Somsak 
Tambunlertchai; World Bank Policy Research Report). 
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7. WHAT IS THE WAY FORWARD FOR SUB-SAHARA AFRICA? 
a. There is emerging convergence of views among some of the earlier opponents of 
ESAPs, the Brettonwoods institutions and African governments. Scope for 
consensus exists. This opportunity should be seized. ESAPs should be refined and 
not scrapped. 
b. Genuine commitment of the authorities in adjusting countries, both at political 
and executive levels, is imperative if ESAPs should be resolutely implemented. 
This creates necessary credibility (Maru ping , World Bank Policy Research 
Report). 
c. Interest and pressure social groups should be involved at the fonnulation and 
design stage of the ESAPs. This way ownership that will bring with it drive, 
cooperation and tolerance, will be elicitated. Members of the public should be 
adequately educated about the content of the programme, reasons behind it and 
expected outcome. This will broaden support for the programme. (Ish rat Husain, 
World Bank Policy Research Report, Maruping). 
d. Action should be taken early. Preferably problems ought to be pre-emptied. This 
way the cost of adjustment will be kept to the minimum. Extensive damage 
should not be allowed to gain ground. In order to do this capacity to recognize 
opportunities and identify problems' early, fonnulate appropriate policies, 
negotiate effectively, implement meticulously, monitor and evaluate competently, 
is needed. This calls for capacity building. It would also be helpful if each 
country could develop its own macro-economic model to assist in accurate 
forecasts. Collection, compilation and analysis of punctual, adequate and 
accurate data is imperative for enlightened macro-economic management. 
e. Proper design of the programme is important. Comprehensive, complementary 
and consistent policy mix is to be ensured . The right pace should be set. Proper 
sequencing of policy measures should be struck. All these depend on state of the 
economy, at the time of design, structure of the economy and unique 
circumstances of each country, as well as all that seems practical and logical. 
Designers should be mindful of the administrative capacity for programme 
implementation. There should be sufficient detail to avoid ambiguities that leave 
room for different interpretations later on to be used as excuses for justifying 
slippages. (OXFAM, ECA, World Bank Policy Research Report). 
The policy mix package should at least include the following , when it comes to structu ral 
measures: 
• human resources development and maintenance through increases in real terms 
of expenditures on education and health; 
• institutional capacity building; 
• civil service refonn yielding a slim but efficient and better motivated as well as 
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user friendly government machinery; 
• conscientising the work force to the importance of increased productivity (There 
should be productivity awareness campaign); Botswana and South Africa have 
already started. 
• poverty alleviation should be the integral part of the programme. This can be 
approached by focusing on: 
rural developments as most of the African poor live in rural areas, 
agriculture, again as the majority of the poor in Africa eke their living in 
subsistence farming, 
urban community development targeted to the poor sections of urban 
populations, 
nurturing the informal sector in general as it supports the majority of the 
people. 
• diversifying production, especially products meant for export.s, so as to be able 
to absorb external shocks, 
• financial sector reform and financial deepening. 
[OXFAM, Ishrat Husain, ECA, World Bank "Policy Research Report] 
Financial sector development and financial deepening are pivotal in that once 
accomplished: 
• effectiveness of monetary and exchange rate policies will be enhanced, 
• mobilization of financial resources will be facilitated, 
• savings, investment, trade, privatization and conunercialization, all tend to 
progress well where the financial sector is well developed and functions well. 
• the private sector thrives where financial and capital markets operate reasonably 
well. 
Capital markets should also be developed to facilitate investment. Only 14 
countries in Africa have functioning stock exchanges. Other countries should 
follow this lead. 
g. In implementing policies, for better results, it will be important to: 
• introduce each policy measure punctually. Timing should be accurate. 
Procrastination can result with the change in parameters on which the policy 
measure was meant to work on, thus calling for a different dose or remedy. 
Economic phenomenon is dynamic, 
• policy measures should be applied decisively and to the fullest extent. Adequate 
dosage is essential for yielding expected results, 
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• resolute action, manifesting commitment and determination, is imperative for 
generating credibility of policies. Intermittent policy applications reversals breed 
the following problems: 
policy measures in question will fail to elicit desirable reaction as key 
players will be expecting usual back-tracking sooner or later, 
policy measures themselves will fail to take effect as economic variables 
will continue to change in the meantime, rendering adopted policies 
irrelevant. 
• adhere to adopted sequencing in order that earlier policy measure pave the way 
for subsequent ones as planned, 
• keep to the agreed pace of implementation for effectiveness. 
h. There is need to provide longer and therefore more adequate time within which 
to achieve results, especially with regard to structural measures. Rigidities and 
sensitivities inherent in developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
have to be recognized and accommodated. 
i. There is need to provide more financial resources to support ESAPs in Sub-
Sahara Africa. More financial support would help reduce strain in the society 
which might cause socio-political unre5t; the weak and poor can be adequately 
cushioned against harsh measures; it would enable effective implementation of 
affirmative policy measures; cost of quick structural reforms would be minimized 
as was the case with Egypt (Sebastian Edwards). 
j. Debt relief of heavily indebted developing countries should be revisited if 
progress in economic reform is to be made. Debt servicing drains considerable 
resources generated thus frustrating capital formation, overshadow economic 
restructuring and in many cases in outright demoralizing. More debt relief is 
called for. Improved debt management in its broad context will also prove most 
helpful in minimizing costs associated with debt servicing. Hence institution of 
the Eastern and Southern African Initiative in Debt and Reserves Management 
(ESAIDARM) project is a welcome development. It seeks to build capacity in 
debt and reserves management in Eastern and Southern Africa. It is the product 
of governors of central banks in Eastern and Southern Afric~. 
k. Structural adjustment programmes ought to be within the context of national 
medium to long term development plans. Proper development planning should 
not be abandoned in the face of jointly prepared Policy Framework Papers 
(PFPs). The national plan and PFP must be in harmony. ESAPs merely seek to 
set the stage for strong and sustained economic growth. Beyond that it is still 
necessary for authorities to adopt and pursue prudent and effective development 
policies. 
I. ESAPs should accommodate regional economic integration efforts of adjusting 
countries. [OXFAM, ECA, Maruping]. 
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m. Developed (OECD) industrial countries ought to reciprocate when it comes to 
trade liberalization so that products of the adjusting countries can find markets 
(OXFAM, Maruping). 
n. &onomic activity does not operate in a vacuum. It operates in a socio-political 
and physical setting. Therefore, in addition to all economic policies recommended 
so far, it is also essential to maintain the following in order to achieve a 
reasonable measure of success: 
there should be empowerment of the masses through democracy, 
political stability is imperative, 
human rights should be protected and civil liberties allowed, 
governance should be improved. This includes accountability, 
transparency, predictability, competence and the rule of law, 
meritocracy should be practised in the public service; it leads to 
competence and efficiency in running public affairs of the country. 
devise and maintain development friendly legal framework, 
contain high population growth, 
use all human resources at the disposal of the country optimally. That 
implies recognizing and facilitating legitimate role of women in 
development, 
in the process of stabilization, structural adjustment and economic 
development, the environment should be protected to ensure 
sustainability. (OXFAM, World Bank). 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing arguments clearly reveal that a large share of criticism levelled against 
ESAPs is not well directed. Often adjusting countries themselves are culprits for not 
adhering to the adopted policies fully. Admittedly there is scope for programme 
refinements, thus reaping the benefits of hindsight. Instead of discarding ESAPs 
altogether it is advisable to improve them at design and implementation stages. 
Convergence of views on ESAPS has been developing for some time. That process must 
be continued in order to build up a consensus on this crucial matter. It has been a long 
way since 1985-88 when differences of opinion were wide and passions ran high in 
international fora. 
ESAPs are necessary to prevent economic collapse of unstable and deteriorating 
economies. How best to refine the design and implementation of the programmes should 
be a subject of continuing research and open discussion. With more open and objective 
dialogue based on well researched reports functional consensus should emerge and 
gather strength. 
Strive to stabilize the economy and to properly adjust its structure are ongoing 
processes. It is true that very drastic steps of stabilizing and restructuring have had to 
be undertaken in Africa in the 1980s and will most probably continue for a few more 
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years to come. This has been largely due to delayed action followed by half-hearted 
attitude of some authorities in tackling the problem headlong. Even after successful 
stabilization and restructuring have been eventually accomplished it will be necessary 
to maintain vigilance. Economies have to be kept stable and still need to be periodically 
adapted to changing situations in this dynamic world. 
At present there is a widening gap in growth between economies of the rest of the world 
and Africa. Africa is falling behind. Africa should strive to narrow, and eventually 
close, that gap. A stable macroeconomy, properly adjusted structure and well grounded 
development policies are the means to that end. 
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